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INTRODUCTION 
Interest in collective bargaining by farmers with the first handlers of 
their products over prices and other terms of trade has been evidenced for 
several years. Such interest is a general manifestation of the trend away from 
an "open market" agriculture to a system increasingly dominated by large-scale 
buyers and characterized by production contracts, private treaty sales and other 
forms of specification buying. This has resulted in a decline in the use of 
open, spot markets as the primary method of exchange and price negotiation. As 
a result, many have looked to collective bargaining as a means for improving the 
equity position of farmers in a system characterized by thin open markets, 
unbalanced market power and low returns to farmers. 
This interest has generated a substantial body of literature, much of it 
authored by agricultural economists, that examines hypothetically the potential 
benefits and costs associated with collective bargaining by farmers (See Breimyer, 
Babb et al., Barr, Knutson, Shaffer and Torgerson, French, Shaffer, and Henderson, 
for examples). Much of this literature discusses at some length the nature and 
sources of economic gains that are potentially achievable, ad nauseum. These 
long lists of potential gains, however, can be categorized into two basic 
areas: distributive and integrative (sometimes referred to as ''pain" and "gain", 
or "disruptive" and "facilitative"). The essential difference between these 
two categories is logical and straightforward: distributive gains are those 
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that farmers achieve at a cost to someone else, such as out of the profits of l 
h82'.:dlers or higher consumer prices, while integrative gains are those that 
are achieved at a cost to no one, that is, they result from improved operating 
and coordinative efficiencies. It has been suggested that integrative gains 
may include such things as improved product quality, decreased price uncertainty, 
reduced product waste and improved seller-buyer coordination. 
Unfortunately, the preponderance of literature contains little empirical 
evidence of the size (magnitude) or source (distributive vs. integrative) of 
economic gains that have actually been achieved through collective bargaining 
efforts by farmers. Yet, such evidence would appear to be rather important, 
particularly as input into the public policy debate over legislation to facil-
itate such collective action. Clearly, the ratio of distributive-to-integrative 
gains bulks upon the extent to which society at large benefits from such legis-
lation, just as the actual magnitude of pecuniary gains realized by farmers 
bulks on their willingness to press for such legislation. 
OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURE 
The purpose of our research was to examine the extent to which integrative 
and/or distributive gains have been achieved through the collective bargaining 
efforts of farmers. That is, we set forth to determine if farmers achieved any 
significant pecuniary gains as a result of collective bargaining and, if so, 
the magnitude and source(s) of these gains, that is, integrative or distributive. 
We were intrigued not only by the scope and nature of pecuniary gains 
associated with farmer bargaining, but also by the task of developing a method 
by which such gains could realistically be measured. In order to accomplish 
our research goals, it was necessary to examine situations in which changes 
in pecuniary returns to members of a bargaining association could, first, be 
segmented into two categories: 1) those changes attributable to collective 
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bargaining, and 2) those occurring for other reasons, and second, to segment 
gains in the first case, i.e. those associated with collective bargaining, into 
the subcategories of distributive and integrative. 
The case study approach was selected as the experimental design most 
likely to isolate the impact of bargaining on pecuniary returns to growers from 
changes not related to bargaining. The case selection criteria reflected this 
need. Thus, we looked for a situation in which a grower association was well 
established as the bargaining agent for growers selling to a given handler 
whose volume represented a relatively small share of the industry total. The 
rationale for these criteria. is straightforward. If the association is success-
ful in influencing price and other terms of exchange with a specific handler, 
but that handler's volume is small compared to the size of the industry, then 
any price gains achieved by the bargaining association for these growers would 
~ have relatively little influence on the overall industry price level. Therefore, 
pecuniary gains to growers associated with collective bargaining could be 
determined by measuring changes in the ratio of prices received by these growers 
to the average industry price. The variable R used to test this relationship 
could be constructed using the equation: 
where: R. 
i = the test statistic, or relative returns to the subset of 
growers who sell to the case handler in the ith time period, 
BPi = the average per unit price paid by the case handler to 
growers in the ith time period, and 
IPi = the average per unit price received by all growers in the 
industry in the ith time period. 
Changes in the test statistic, Ri, measures changes in pecuniary returns 
to growers selling to the handler with which the association bargains, relative 
to industry-wide returns. This becomes a proxy for pecuniary gains associated 
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with collective bargaining, exclusive of changes occurring due to shifts in J 
supply-demand conditions in the industry not associated with collective bar-
gaining, provided of course that the industry-wide supply-demand conditions are 
not influenced by collective bargaining elsewhere. If this test revealed 
pecuniary gains to growers associated with collective bargaining, the analysis 
would be extended to examine the nature of such gains, that is, distributive 
or integrative. 
THE RESEARCH SE'I'TING 
The great lakes concord grape industry provided a situation closely 
meeting our selection ·criteria. Concord grapes enjoy a modicum of distinction 
from other varieties grown in the U.S. as this is the preferred variety for 
most jams, jellies and sweet juices, whereas wines are the primary market for 
other varieties. Over 90 percent of the concords are grown in the eastern 
great lakes states: New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan, plus Washington 
(see Schmelzer, ch. 3 for greater detail). New York dominates the eastern 
pool with about 60 percent of the annual production. Ohio production is small 
relative to the industry total, generally accounting for 5-6 percent of the 
annual harvest. 
The concord industry is highly concentrated at the first handler level. 
Welch, a large processing and marketing cooperative in western New York, accounts 
for an estimated 70 percent of the first handler volume. As a producer cooper-
ative, grower terms are established on a participation basis rather than through 
collective bargaining. Small processors handle the balance of the industry 
volume. There is just one major processor in Ohio, a subsidiary of the Coca 
Cola Company, that generally processes the equivalent to 1/3 to 1/2 of Ohio's 
crop, or about 2-3 percent of the total eastern pool. The Tri-County Grape 
Growers Association (TCGGA), an affiliate of the Ohio Agricultural Marketing 
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Association (OAMA.), bargains on the collective behalf of growers who ship to 
the Coca Cola plant. 
While all of the Coca Cola growers are not members of Tri-County, once the 
association and the handler have reached an agreement on contract terms, those 
terms are offered to all of Coca Cola's growers. Thus, this situation represents 
the desired case--one where the bargaining association influences returns to an 
identifiable group of growers but where the total volume so negotiated is small 
relative to the industry total and therefore has little if any influence on 
the aggregate industry price. Additionally, the industry meets most of the 
conditions generally considered conducive to collective bargaining: a highly 
perishable crop, extensive use of contracts, no viable open market, and few 
market alternatives for growers. Furthermore, TCGGA has been in existence 
since 1956 and OAMA has been its bargaining agent since 1967, thus providing 
~ a historical record of bargaining performance. 
c 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The first analysis conducted was to determine if the collective bargaining 
activities had influenced R, the pecuniary returns to growers represented by 
the association relative to industry-wide returns. Data were collected for 
the variables BP and IP on an annual basis for each year from 1950 through 
1973, the most recent price data available due to the delay in determining 
industry-wide prices where these are based upon participation plans. Unfor-
tunately, data for the variable BP for the years 1953 through 1956 could not 
be located. Therefore, values for the test statistic, R, could not be cal-
culated for those years. 
The data were partitioned into three time periods that correspond with 
discrete sets of collective bargaining activities: t 1 includes 1950 through 
1956, a period when there was no organized bargaining activity; t 2 is 1957 
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through 1967, inclusive, the period when TCGGA was organized and gaining recog-
nition by the handler but during which little organized bargaining occurred; 
and t 3 , 1968 to 1973, inclusive, the period within which organized bargaining 
has occurred under the auspices of OAMA. 
The test statistic, R, was then partitioned into groups that correspond to 
these time periods. The hypothetical relationship was: 
Where: Rt is the mean price ratio in time period tl, 1 
~2 is the mean price ratio in time period t2, and 
Rt is the mean price ratio in time period t3. 
3 
A one-way analysis of variance was used to determine if there were stat is-
tically significant differences among the three mean values. The F-ratio test 
revealed differences that were statistically significant at the 0.01 level. ~ 
Scheffe's general method S test was then used for multiple comparisons between 
each pair of mean values . .!/ This test indicated the following relationships: 
Significant at the 0.05% level: 





Thus, these results are somewhat different from the expected relationship. 
Instead of confirming pecuniary gains associated with early collective bar-
gaining. efforts, they indicate a relative pecuniary loss for growers during the 
period of initial organization and operation of TCGGA. However, that loss 




There are at least two possible explanations for the contrary-to-expec-
tation finding. First, the missing data from the t 1 period may have biased 
upward the value of Rtl' thus distorting the results. Second, the growers 
may have been subjected to "handler backlash" and were penalized with somewhat 
lower prices during the organizational period of TCGGA. 
Confirmation of the expected pecuniary gains associated with the bargaining 
activities of OAMA does suggest, however, that the type and size of the bar-
gaining organization, and its method of operation, may be important variables 
in determining the magnitude of gains achievable through collective negotiations. 
OAMA was able to bring both improved market-wide information and more experienced 
negotiators to bear on the bargaining process. However, both TCGGA and OAMA 
have consistently bargained from a relatively weak position, having exclusive 
marketing rights to only about 4o percent of Coca Cola's total annual purchases. 
~ Thus, the threat to withhold supplies in the case of negotiation deadlock, 
c 
which is the ultimate leverage point in any collective bargaining process, has 
probably not been a viable bargaining tool in this situation. 
INTEGRATIVE VS. DISTRIBUTIVE GAINS 
Although the results of the analysis of relative prices received by growers 
represented by the bargaining association were only partially as hypothesized, 
the significant differences between Rt2 and Rt 3 indicated that further analysis 
was warranted. The relevant question is, to what extent are the higher relative 
returns in the latter time period attributable to improved efficiency and 
other integrative gains as opposed to a simple redistribution of income. 
Because the bargaining association had direct control over less than half 
Gf the handler's volume, it may not have had sufficient bargaining leverage to 
extract large distributive gains. Rather, because the contract terms nego-
tiated between the association and the handler are generally accepted by all 
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growers wnc ship to Coca Cola, members and nonmembers alike, it may be that l 
those co~~~act terms are such that integrative gains result. Thus, the analysis 
was extended to determine to what extent the pecuniary gains in period t 3 
relative to period t 2 were due, in part, to two measures of integrative gains: 
improved processor efficiency resulting from a more orderly product flow and 
improved grower-handler coordination, and improved resource allocation through 
reduced price uncertainty resulting from greater price stability. 
To analyze the impact of collective bargaining on processor efficiency, 
the test statistic ER was constructed where ERi was specified as the ratio of 
the average daily grape tonnage processed in the ith year to the average daily 
plant capacity in the ith year. The rationale for this measure was that, if 
grower-processor coordination is improved as a result of collective bargaining, 
then the average daily utilization of the processing facility would increase. 
The data were partitioned into two time periods identified, a posteriori, 
as relevant to organizational changes in collective bargaining: t2, the 1957-
1967 pre OAMA period.s'; and t 3 , 1968-1973, during which OAMA has negotiated 
contract terms with the handler. The earlier time period t 1 , the period prior 
to the initial organization of TCGGA, was not included in this analysis as 
data on daily plant utilization rates were not available for that period. 
The hypothetical relationship was: 
Where: ERt is the mean plant utilization ratio in time period t 2 , and 
2 
ERt is the mean plant utilization ratio in time period t 3 . 
3 
Subjecting the test statistics to an analysis of variance and F-test 
revealed no significant differences between the mean utilization ratios 
t 
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achieved prior to, and following, OAMA bargaining, at the 0,10 percent con-
fidence level. This analysis, therefore, provides no evidence of significant 
gains in the operational efficiency of the processing plant that are directly 
attributable to the bargaining association. Quite possibly the handler has 
achieved the available coordinative efficiencies through grower contracts that 
allow his field men to coordinate harvesting activities rather than through 
any activity of the association. That is, coordinative gains may be a function 
of contracting rather than bargaining, per se. 
To analyze the impact of collective bargaining on price stability, the 
test statistic CV was constructed to measure the variance in prices received 
by Coca Cola growers relative to the variance in industry-wide prices over time. 
The supporting logic is this: if the collective bargaining association generates 
more stable prices for its growers over time, then the coefficient of variation 
~ in grower prices relative to industry-wide prices should be smaller during 
the period of active group bargaining than when the growers were not engaged 
in collective negotiations. 
For this analysis, the data were partitioned into 3 time periods of 6 
years each: the first two, t 2a and t 2b, correspond with 6-year time periods 
for which data were available prior to bargaining by OAMA, 1957 through 1962 
and 1962 through 1967, respectively. The third time period, t 3 , corresponds 
to the period of OAMA bargaining, 1968 through 1973. The six year groupings 
were used to equalize the number of observations between the pre-OAMA and 
post-OAMA data, thus eliminating the influence of different numbers of observa-
tions on the total variance within the time periods. 
The hypothetical relationships were: 
cvt2a L cvt3 , and 





is the coefficient of variation in grower to industry 
prices in time period t 2a, 
is the coefficient of variation in grower to industry 
prices in time period t2b' and 
is the coefficient of variation in grower to industry 
prices in time period t3. 
The actual coefficients of variance confirm that, as hypothesized, there 
was a smaller variance in the ratio of grower to industry prices, 0.10, during 
the period of OAMA bargaining than in either of the previous time periods (0.21 
in t 2a and 0.30 in t 2b). This analysis, therefore, tends to confirm the 
expected relationship between collective bargaining and price stability. As 
Chayat, et. al., have demonstrated, increased price stability results in both 
direct benefits to producers in terms of higher incomes or reduced losses over 
time, and reduced social costs as price risk is reduced and resource allocation ~ 
improved. Overall, therefore, our analysis indicates that voluntary collective 
bargaining, such as in this case, shows potential for modest distributive gains 
when the bargaining agent is a skilled and knowledgeable negotiator, at least 
to the extent of a nuisance payment. However, integrative economic gains asso-
ciated with improved price stability may be its most desirable product. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Our effort to shed empirical light on some of the theoretical benefits 
frequently argued for collective bargaining by farmers has shown a modicum of 
success. Using a case study approach and examining a situation in which callee-
tive negotiation is voluntary, some clarification has been gained into the 
magnitude and sources of actual economic gains associated with such bargaining. 
The magnitude of pecuniary gains to producers for which the association is 




growers contracted with a larger and more experienced bargaining unit to repre-
sent them in collective negotiations with the handler. This suggests that 
there may be some important size advantages in bargaining associations, partic-
ularly in their ability to procure more, relevant information and the skill 
with which they can use this in the bargaining process. At the same time, it 
became apparent that, with no more than 40 percent of the handler's supply 
firmly committed to the bargaining association, the association did not have 
enough leverage to extract large distributive gains from the handler, that is, 
higher prices for growers at the expense of the handlers profits or higher 
costs passed through to consumers. An important question remaining unanswered 
is, what share of the handler's volume need the association represent to generate 
more substantial distributive pecuniary gains for its growers? Clearly, 40 
percent is not sufficient. 
In the case studied, gains of an integrative nature also accrued to 
producers. However, there was no evidence that these resulted from specific 
improvements in the coordination of product movement from growers to the 
handler. That type of coordinative efficiency gain appears largely a function 
of contracting, not collective bargaining, per se. Rather, the integrative 
gains were due primarily to improved price stability. While more stable prices 
do lead to both social and producer benefits, such benefits accrue rather 
circuitously, thus, are difficult to verify and may provide little direct 
support for voluntary collective bargaining efforts. 
Little light has been shed on the question of mandatory vs. voluntary 
collective bargaining. This study is suggestive that mandatory action may 
be necessary if collective bargaining is to achieve significant distributive-
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type pecuniary gains for farmers, Likewise, the extent to which integrative ~ 
gains could be enhanced by mandatory bargaining remains moot. Nonetheless, 
the results of our study suggest that the strongest rationale for mandatory 





!I There are several multiple comparison procedures, of which Scheffe's S 
offered the greatest appeal in this analysis. The more common least sig-
nificant difference (lsd) procedure, while accurate for unequal numbers 
of observations within treatments, cannot be used to test all possible 
combinations of treatment means. Duncan's, Turkey's and the Student-
Newman-Keuls procedures allow for comparison of all possible sets of means 
but are not accurate for treatments with unequal numbers of observations. 
The S test, however, is appealing because it can be used in conjunction 
with the F-test, permits comparisons of all possible sets of means and is 
an accurate test of significance for means that contain unequal numbers 
of observation. 
Data were not available on daily utilization rates for the years 1957 and 
1958. Therefore, only data from the years 1959 through 1967, inclusive, 
are included in time period t2 for purposes of the analysis of processor 
efficiency. 
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